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Abstract This study explored whether adults and adoles-
cents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) demonstrate
difficulties making metacognitive judgments, specifically
judgments of learning. Across two experiments, the study
examined whether individuals with ASD could accurately
judge whether they had learnt a piece of information (in
this case word pairs). In Experiment 1, adults with ASD
demonstrated typical accuracy on a standard ‘cue-alone’
judgment of learning (JOL) task, compared to age- and IQ-
matched neurotypical adults. Additionally, in Experiment
2, adolescents with ASD demonstrated typical accuracy on
both a standard ‘cue-alone’ JOL task, and a ‘cue-target’
JOL task. These results suggest that JOL accuracy is
unimpaired in ASD. These results have important impli-
cations for both theories of metacognition in ASD and
educational practise.
Keywords Autism  Memory  Metacognition 
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Introduction
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental dis-
order diagnosed on the basis of social-communication
deficits, and fixated interests and repetitive behaviours
(American Psychiatric Association 2013). There is sub-
stantial evidence that, at the cognitive level, individuals
with ASD manifest impairments in representing others’
mental states (‘‘mindreading’’ or ‘‘theory of mind’’; see
Yirmiya et al. 1998) and that this contributes to social-
communication features of ASD (see Brunsdon and Happe´
2014). Recently, however, studies have begun to find evi-
dence that individuals with ASD also manifest difficulties
with representing their own mental states (so-called
‘‘metacognition’’).
There is now reasonably consistent evidence that indi-
viduals with ASD manifest high rates of alexithymia, the
inability to accurately identify and describe one’s own
emotions (Hill et al. 2004; Silani et al. 2008), and show
diminished performance in ‘‘self-versions’’ of classic
mindreading tasks, in which they are required to explain
their own behaviour in terms of underlying mental states
(e.g., Williams and Happe´ 2009). However, very little is
known about the extent to which individuals with ASD are
able to monitor other aspects of cognitive activity in
themselves. The ability to represent one’s own current,
online mental states and cognitive activity is termed
metacognitive monitoring, and is important for everyday
self-regulation of behaviour and learning. For example, to
study for an exam successfully, an individual needs to
accurately monitor what information they already know
and what they still need to learn. In this way, they can
modify their learning/study behaviour accordingly, and
spend more time studying appropriate information. Indeed,
studies that have shown that several educational outcomes
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(such as exam performance) can be predicted by
metacognitive monitoring accuracy, (e.g., Hartwig et al.
2012; Thiede et al. 2003). Given that individuals with ASD
often demonstrate difficulties self-regulating their beha-
viours, and often underperform at school relative to IQ-
matched peers (see Estes et al. 2011; Jones et al. 2009), the
study of metacognitive monitoring in ASD is important.
Metacognitive monitoring is usually assessed by asking
individuals to make online judgements about the current
state of their knowledge or learning. For example, in ‘‘feeling
of knowing’’ (FOK) tasks, participants are asked to predict
whether they would be able to correctly recognise a memory
target that they cannot currently recall (e.g., an individual
might fail to recall the capital city of Australia, but still feel
confident that they would recognise the correct city (Can-
berra) when presented with a list of several options). Alter-
natively, in standard judgement of confidence (JOC) tasks
participants are typically asked to make retrospective
judgements assessing how confident they are that their
answer to a question is correct. The few existing studies of
metacognitive monitoring in ASD have suggested that
individuals with this disorder demonstrate diminished
accuracy when making both feeling of knowing judgements
(Grainger et al. 2014; Wojcik et al. 2013) and judgments of
confidence (Grainger et al. 2016; Wilkinson et al. 2010;
Brosnan et al. 2015; McMahon et al. 2016; but see Sawyer
et al. 2014). That is, the correspondence between partici-
pants’ predictions about their ownmemory performance and
their actual memory performance appears to be lower among
individuals with ASD than among neurotypical individuals,
when making these types of metacognitive judgments.
However, one crucial type of metacognitive judgement that
has barely been explored in ASD involves monitoring one’s
own current state of learning.
During a standard judgement of learning (JOL) task
participants are initially asked to memorise a series of
stimulus pairs (e.g., pairs of words, such as ‘‘pen-key’’,
‘‘computer-elephant’’ etc.). After this study phase, partici-
pants completed a JOL phase. During this phase, partici-
pants are sequentially presented with one stimulus from
each pair (the cue; e.g., ‘‘pen’’) and asked to make a
judgement about the likelihood that, at a later point, they
will be able to remember its accompanying, paired stimu-
lus (the target; i.e., ‘‘key’’). Finally, during a recall phase,
participants are presented with each cue stimulus in turn
and asked to recall the corresponding missing target stim-
ulus. The accuracy of participants’ metacognitive judge-
ments is measured by comparing participants’ judgments
about their future recall performance with their actual
recall performance.
To date, only one study has explored JOL accuracy in
individuals with ASD (Wojcik et al. 2014). In one exper-
iment (Experiment 1), adolescents with ASD and
neurotypical adolescents were visually presented with word
pairs during a study phase. Participants were then either
asked to make immediate judgements (after each study
trial) about whether they would be able to remember the
target words (an immediate JOL task) or to make JOL
decisions after a delay (during a delayed JOL task). The
accuracy of participants’ judgments was assessed using
Gamma correlations (Goodman and Kruskal 1954).
Gamma correlations are the standard measure used to
assess metacognitive accuracy on JOL tasks, and measure
the association between individuals’ predictions about
whether they have learnt a piece of information with their
subsequent memory for that piece of information on a
recall task (see the Method section for a more detailed
description of how Gamma correlations are calculated).
Wojcik et al. (2014) reported that adolescents with ASD
were as accurate as neurotypical participants at judging
their future memory performance, across both the imme-
diate and delayed JOL tasks. Additionally, in a second
experiment (Experiment 2), adolescents with ASD and
neurotypical adolescents were asked to make delayed JOL
decisions for both easy word pairs (made up of concrete
nouns, e.g. paper-water) and hard word pairs (made up of
abstract nouns, e.g. dream-fluency). Again, for both easy
and difficult word pairs, Wojcik et al. (2014) found no
group difference in JOL accuracy, and concluded that
individuals with ASD were as good at making accurate
judgements of learning as neurotypical individuals.
However, there are several reasons to be cautious when
drawing conclusions from Wojcik et al.’s (2014) study.
First, there was strong indication that monitoring accuracy
was impaired in individuals with ASD in at least one
respect. In the immediate JOL task (reported in Experiment
1), the mean gamma score was .05 (SD = .11) among
participants with ASD and .27 (SD = .11) among com-
parison participants. Although the difference between
groups in accuracy was not statistically significant, it was
associated with a very large effect size, according to our
calculations (Cohen d = 2.00). In other words, metacog-
nitive monitoring in this condition did appear to be
diminished in participants with ASD. Indeed, Wojcik et al.
reported that performance was not even significantly above
chance among participants with ASD, making an accurate
interpretation of between-group differences difficult.
Secondly, in Wojcik et al.’s (2014) Experiment 2, there
is some ambiguity about which participants were included
in the analysis of gamma scores (i.e., JOL accuracy).
Although their Table 3 (p. 401) reports gamma scores
among n = 19 participants per diagnostic group, the
ANOVA conducted with Gamma score as the dependent
variable is associated with only 26 degrees of freedom (see
Wojcik et al. 2014, pp. 401–402). In that case, it is unclear
whether participant groups were matched for the relevant
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baseline characteristics (see Mervis and Klein-Tasman
2004, for a discussion of the importance of group match-
ing). Given (a) these uncertainties about Wojcik et al.’s
findings, (b) that Wojcik et al.’s findings are out of keeping
with the findings of studies that have investigated other
types of metacognitive judgement, and (c) the important
role JOL accuracy plays in everyday learning, a further
investigation of this issue among closely matched groups
of ASD and comparison participants is timely.
The aim of the current study was to accurately assess
JOL accuracy in individuals with ASD. The design we
employed was similar to the design employed by Wojcik
et al. (2014) in their delayed JOL condition, but among
closely matched groups of participants so as to remove
potential ambiguity in interpreting experimental results.
Our main prediction for Experiment 1 was that adults with
ASD would demonstrate diminished JOL accuracy,
reflecting impaired metacognitive monitoring (in keeping
with findings from studies of other types of metacognitive
judgement).
Experiment 1: Method
Participants
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from Durham
University Psychology Research Ethics Committee. Eigh-
teen adults with ASD (13 males, 5 females) and 18 neu-
rotypical comparison adults (11 males, 7 females) took
part, all of whom gave written, informed consent before
participating. Participants in the ASD group had all
received formal diagnoses of autistic disorder (n = 4) or
Asperger’s disorder (n = 14), according to DSM-IV or
ICD-10 criteria (American Psychiatric Association 2013;
World Heath Organisation 1993). In order to assess current
ASD features, 15 of the 18 participants in the ASD group
completed Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Gen-
eric (ADOS; Lord et al. 2000) assessments (which were
administered by a trained, research-reliable assessor). The
ADOS is a semi-structured, standardized assessment of
communication, social interaction, and imaginative use of
materials that can be used to help diagnose ASD. The
remaining three participants declined to complete the
ADOS, as they did not feel comfortable being filmed. Each
of the three participants who did not complete the ADOS
had a confirmed ASD diagnosis and scored above the cut-
off on the Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen
et al. 2001), a self-report questionnaire that assesses ASD/
ASD-like features. All participants who completed the
ADOS received a total score C7, the defined cut-off for
ASD (Lord et al. 2000). All participants completed the AQ
questionnaire. Fifteen out of 18 participants with ASD
scored above the defined cut-off for ASD on the AQ (total
score C26; Woodbury-Smith et al. 2005). Only three par-
ticipants missed this cut-off. However, all three of these
participants scored well above the defined ASD cut-off on
the ADOS (all ADOS scores among these three participants
were C12). All comparison participants scored below the
defined cut-off for ASD on the AQ.
No participants, in either group, reported using any
psychotropic medication or any history of neurological or
psychiatric disorders (apart from ASD). The participant
groups were closely equated for verbal and non-verbal
ability (see Table 1 for participant characteristics). Groups
were also closely equated for chronological age and sex.
Materials and Procedures
Judgement of Learning Task
A delayed JOL design was employed, consisting of a study
phase, a JOL phase, and a cued-recall test phase (please see
Fig. 1 for a graphical representation of the task). The stimuli
used during the JOL task were 80 word pairs (160 words) all
of which all were concrete nouns. Each word pair was made
up of a ‘‘cue’’ word, which was used as a cue in both the JOL
and cued-recall test phase, and a ‘‘target’’ word, which par-
ticipants were not presented with during the JOL or cued-
recall phase. Cue words and target words were matched for
word frequency (Kucera and Francis 1967), as reported in the
MRC psycholinguistic database (Coltheart 1981). The ade-
quacy of this matching was confirmed by a non-significant
main effect of word type (cue/target) in an ANOVA, that
included word frequency as the dependent variable, F (1,
158) = 1.63, p = .204, gp
2 = .01.
Before participants completed the task, the entire
procedure was explained to them, and they completed a
practice of the task (consisting of five word pairs that
did not overlap with the test stimuli) before beginning
the experimental trials. As such, before studying the
word pairs, participants were aware that their memory
for each word pair would be tested. The task was run on
an LG desktop computer and lasted approximately
25 min.
Study Phase Firstly participants completed the study
phase of the task. During this phase, participants were
presented with the 80 cue-target word pairs. Word pairs
were presented to participants sequentially and they were
asked to memorise each pair shown on the screen, and then
to click the mouse whenever they were ready to see the
next pair. Whenever the mouse was clicked the next word
pair appeared on the screen. As such, participants could
take as long as they wanted to learn each pair. Word pairs
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were presented to all participants during the study phase in
the same fixed, randomised order.
JOL Phase After the study phase, there was a 5-min
break. Participants then completed the JOL phase. During
the JOL phase participants were individually presented, in
a fixed random order (different to the order presented
during the study phase), with the cue words alone. For
example, if participants were presented with the cue-target
word pair, ‘‘bear-bridge’’ during the study phase, during
the JOL phase, they were presented with the cue word
‘‘bear-?’’ alone and asked to judge whether they thought
they would be able to later recall the correct target word
(‘‘bridge’’). For each cue word, participants were asked to
make a JOL (either ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No’’) as to whether they
would be able to recall the associated target word, when
prompted with the cue word at a later point. Participants
made their JOL response by pressing the ‘‘Y’’ key on the
keyboard if they thought they would correctly remember
the missing target word, and the ‘‘N’’ key if they did not
think they would know the missing word (no time limit was
imposed).
Cued-Recall Phase Immediately after the JOL phase,
participants completed a cued-recall test. They were
presented with the cue words again sequentially, in a
random order (again different to the order presented
during the study or JOL phase), and were asked to recall
the missing target word. Participants typed out their
response, and submitted it by pressing the ‘‘enter’’ key.
Once a recall response was submitted, the next cue word
appeared on the screen. There was no time limit on this
part of the task.
Scoring
Memory Performance
Participants’ cued-recall memory performance on the JOL
task was calculated as the proportion of target words
correctly recalled during the cued-recall stage. The vast
majority of recall responses were unambiguously correct
or incorrect. However, on a very small number of occa-
sions there was some debate as to whether a recall
response should be considered correct. On such occasions
recall responses were only considered correct if partici-
pants had (a) recalled a plural of the target word (e.g., if
the target word was ‘‘tree’’, a recall response of ‘‘trees’’
was considered correct), or (b) had clearly made a typing
error when entering their response (e.g., if the target word
Table 1 Participant characteristics (means, standard deviations and inferential statistics) for the participants in Experiment 1
Group t p Cohen’s d
ASD (n = 18) Neurotypical (n = 18)
Age (years) 28.96 (10.28) 30.43 (14.59) 0.35 .730 0.12
VIQ 111.67 (14.66) 112.28 (10.87) 0.14 .888 0.05
PIQ 109.67 (15.75) 114.50 (10.96) 1.07 .293 0.36
FSIQ 112.33 (15.00) 114.94 (10.50) 0.61 .549 0.20
AQ total score 33.39 (9.24) 13.00 (6.22) 7.77 \.001 2.59
ADOS social ? communication scorea 11.93 (2.19)
AQ Autism-spectrum Quotient, ADOS Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, PIQ performance IQ, FSIQ full scale IQ, VIQ verbal IQ
a Based on 15/18 participants
Fig. 1 Graphical representation
of the JOL task used in
Experiment 1
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was ‘‘tree’’, a recall response of ‘‘treew’’ was also con-
sidered correct). Recall responses that were semantically
similar to the target word, but were not the correct target
word, were considered incorrect (e.g., if the target word
was ‘‘flask’’, a recall response of ‘‘thermos’’ was consid-
ered wrong).
Metacognitive Performance
Gamma scores (Goodman and Kruskal 1954) were calcu-
lated to provide an index of overall JOL accuracy. This
analysis is recommended by Nelson (1984) and is com-
monly used to analyse JOL tasks (e.g. Wojcik et al. 2014).
Gamma scores are a non-parametric measure of association
(between participants’ predictions and actual performance)
and were calculated by comparing the number of correct
predictions that each individual made with the number of
incorrect predictions they made. To calculate gamma
scores, the formula G = (ad - bc)/(ad ? bc) was used,
with (a) representing the number of correct ‘‘Yes’’ pre-
dictions an individual made, (b) representing the number of
incorrect ‘‘Yes’’ predictions, (c) representing the number
of incorrect ‘‘No’’ predictions, and (d) representing the
number of correct ‘‘No’’ predictions. Gamma scores range
between ? 1 and -1, where a score of 0 indicates chance-
level accuracy, a large positive value indicates a good
degree of accuracy, and a large negative value indicates
less than chance-level performance on the task. However,
when calculating gamma scores, the score cannot be cal-
culated when two or more of the prediction rates (a, b, c, or
d) are equal to 0. As such, the raw data were adjusted by
adding 0.5 onto each prediction frequency and dividing by
the overall number of JOL judgements made (N) plus 1
(N ? 1). This correction is recommended by Snodgrass
and Corwin (1988) and is routinely used when calculating
gamma scores on metacognitive tasks (e.g., Bastin et al.
2012; Wojcik et al. 2013).
In addition to gamma scores, the proportion of errors
made by participants in each group was calculated for two
different types of error in JOL predictions. The proportion
of under-confident errors participants made was calcu-
lated as the number of incorrect ‘‘No’’ predictions, in
which they failed to predict their subsequently successful
recall of a target word, divided by the total number of
judgments made. The proportion of over-confident errors
participants made was calculated as the number of
incorrect ‘‘Yes’’ predictions made, in which they inaccu-
rately predicted that they would recall a word that they
subsequently failed to remember, divided by the total
number of judgments made.
Experiment 1: Results
Judgment of Learning (JOL) Task
Memory Performance
The group difference in cued-recall memory performance
was examined using an independent-samples t test (see
Table 2 for descriptive and inferential statistics). This
indicated that individuals in the ASD group recalled sig-
nificantly fewer target words than comparison participants
during the JOL task.
Metacognitive performance
Group differences in metacognitive monitoring accuracy
were also examined (see Table 2 for descriptive and
inferential statistics). An independent-samples t test indi-
cated that there was no significant difference in gamma
score between the ASD and neurotypical groups. Thus, not
in keeping with predictions, participants with ASD were
not significantly poorer at predicting their own memory
performance than were neurotypical participants, on the
JOL task. One-sample t tests indicated that gamma scores
were significantly above chance (i.e. significantly greater
than 0) in both diagnostic groups, all ts[ 21.16, all
ps\ .001.
An additional analysis was also carried out to investigate
whether the significant group difference in cued-recall of
target words confounded performance at the meta-level of
the task (i.e., JOL accuracy). For the purpose of this
analysis, two participants from each group were excluded
to create ASD and neurotypical groups that were matched
closely for recall ability, t (30) = 1.31, p = .200,
d = 0.47. These sub-groups also remained matched for
age, VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ (all ps[ .52, all ds\ 0.23). An
independent-samples t test indicated that even when groups
were equated closely for recall ability, JOL gamma scores
were still not significantly different in the ASD group
(M = .75, SD = .13) than in the neurotypical group
(M = .70, SD = .15), t (30) = 1.15, p = .261, d = 0.36.
Group differences in the specific type of errors partici-
pants made on the JOL task were also examined. Inde-
pendent-samples t tests indicated no between-group
differences in the proportion of under- or over-confident
JOL errors (see Table 2 for statistics). One-sample t tests
also indicated that the proportion of under- or over-confi-
dent JOL errors participants made was significantly above
chance (i.e. significantly greater than 0), in both diagnostic
groups, all ts[ 2.47, all ps\ .024.
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Relation Between JOL Accuracy and AQ Scores
In order to investigate the relation between metacognitive
JOL accuracy and ASD/ASD-like traits, correlation anal-
yses were performed among each diagnostic group. Among
neither group was AQ total score significantly associated
with JOL accuracy, all rs B .33, all ps C .183.
Experiment 1: Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that JOL accuracy is
undiminished among adults with ASD, contrary to expec-
tations. However, it is important to consider alternative
explanations before concluding that monitoring of own
learning is intact in ASD. One possible explanation for the
results of Experiment 1, and indeed Wojcik et al.’s (2014)
findings, is that individuals with ASD used an atypical
strategy to complete the task that required only very lim-
ited metacognitive monitoring. In other words, it might be
possible that participants with ASD performed well on the
delayed JOL task, despite diminished underlying
metacognitive monitoring competence. Both this study and
Wojcik et al. employed a standard JOL procedure in which
participants were asked to make so-called ‘‘cue-alone’’
judgements (Dunlosky and Nelson 1992). During the JOL
phase, participants were presented only with the cue word
and were asked the judge the likelihood that they would
later recall the corresponding target word. It may be that
during a cue-alone JOL task, when presented with the cue
word (e.g., ‘‘bear-?’’) and asked to make a JOL about
whether you will remember what the missing target word is
at a later point, individuals adopt the strategy of simply
answering ‘‘yes’’ if, at the point they make the JOL, they
can remember the target word, and ‘‘no’’ if they cannot (in
other words, they are not making a prediction as such). In
this case, relatively accurate JOLs could be made on a cue-
alone JOL task, simply by judging whether one can bring to
mind the target word at the time a JOL is made (a strategy
that involves no metacognitive monitoring processes). In
other words, rather than monitoring the extent to which a
target item has been successfully encoded and stored for
later retrieval, participants could merely monitor whether
or not the target item could be brought to mind currently.
Importantly, this could also explain Wojcik et al.’s (2014)
reported failure to find diagnostic group differences in JOL
accuracy.
Additionally, whilst Experiment 1 suggested JOL
accuracy is intact in adults with ASD, impairments in JOL
accuracy may be developmental in nature and only
apparent in children/adolescents with ASD. Experiment 2
addressed both these issues, and explored JOL accuracy in
adolescents with ASD, using two JOL paradigms. An
important variant to a standard JOL procedure involves
participants making so-called ‘‘cue-target’’ rather than
‘‘cue-alone’’ judgements (Dunlosky and Nelson 1992). In
this type of JOL task, individuals are asked to determine
the future retrievability of the target when presented with
both the cue and the target. During a cue-target JOL task, it
is not possible to adopt a strategy of immediate self-testing
of one’s current memory for a missing target item. In
Experiment 2, adolescents with ASD and neurotypical
adolescents completed both a cue-alone JOL task and a
cue-target JOL task. It was predicted that adolescents with
ASD would demonstrate impaired JOL accuracy on the
cue-target JOL task, but not on the cue-alone JOL task.
Experiment 2: Method
Participants
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the
University of Kent Psychology Research Ethics Commit-
tee. Twenty-two adolescents with ASD (19 males, 3
females) and 21 neurotypical comparison adolescents (19
males, 2 females) took part in this experiment, after their
parents had given written, informed consent. Participants in
the ASD group had all received formal diagnoses of
autistic disorder (n = 17) or Asperger’s disorder (n = 5).
Table 2 Means (SDs) and inferential statistics for group differences in performance on the judgment of learning task used in Experiment 1
Group t p Cohen’s d
ASD (n = 18) Neurotypical (n = 18)
Proportion of targets recalled .30 (.26) .49 (.25) 2.28 .029 0.74
Gamma scorea .76 (.13) .71 (.14) 1.06 .295 0.37
Proportion of over-confident judgments .09 (.06) .11 (.07) 1.18 .247 0.31
Proportion of under-confident judgments .03 (.05) .03 (.03) 0.05 .958 0.00
a Gamma scores index metacognitive monitoring accuracy
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Parents of all children completed the Social Responsive-
ness Scale (SRS; Constantino et al. 2003), a parental report
used to assess the severity of ASD features. T-scores of 60
and above are considered consistent with an ASD diagnosis
(Constantino et al. 2003). In all but one case, participants
with ASD scored above the ASD cut-off. The remaining
participant, who scored 55 on the SRS, had a formal,
verified diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder, accord-
ing to DSM-IV-TR criteria and was therefore included
despite the slightly lower than expected SRS score.
Neurotypical participants were recruited from main-
stream schools in the local area. The ASD and neurotypical
groups were equated closely for VIQ, PIQ, FSIQ, and
chronological age. Participant characteristics are presented
in Table 3. All but four neurotypical adolescents scored
below 60 on the SRS (the cut-off for ASD). One partici-
pant had a borderline score of exactly 60 and three others
scored above the cut-off. None of the teachers or parents of
these participants reported any history of ASD (or concern
about a developmental disorder) in these four adolescents,
and none of the participants had any diagnosis. It is unli-
kely, therefore, that these individuals had an undiagnosed
ASD. However, to ensure that including these participants
in the overall sample did not affect the results of the study,
all experimental analyses in the paper were re-run
excluding these participants (and excluding the one par-
ticipant with ASD who scored below the SRS cut-off). We
report the key experimental results after removing these
participants in Footnote 1. The results were almost iden-
tical with and without these neurotypical participants
included.
Materials and Procedures
Judgment of Learning Tasks
Two sets of 22 word pairs (44 words in total) were used as
stimuli for the JOL tasks. Both sets were matched for mean
syllable length and word frequency (Kucera and Francis
1967), as reported in the MCR psycholinguistic database
(Coltheart 1981). To check that the words used in each set
were adequately matched, a multivariate analysis of syl-
lable length and word frequency across both sets was
carried out. There was no main effect of set, as established
by Wilks’ Lambda criterion, F (2, 85) = .152, p = .859,
gp
2 = .004. Participants were tested individually on both
tasks during two separate testing sessions (please see Fig. 2
for a graphical representation of both JOL tasks). To avoid
any order effects, the order participants completed each
JOL task was counterbalanced. Before completing either
task participants completed a practice block, consisting of
five word pairs.
Cue-Alone JOL Task
The procedure employed during the cue-alone judgment of
learning task used a delayed JOL design, consisting of a
study phase, a JOL phase and a cued-recall test phase (and
was similar to the task employed in Experiment 1). The
task was run on a Sony VAIO laptop, and lasted approxi-
mately 15–20 min. During the study phase, participants
were individually presented with 22 cue-target word pairs
for 8 s each, in a fixed randomised order. Participants were
told that their memory for each word pair would be tested
at a later point, with the presentation of the cue word alone.
After the learning phase participants then completed the
JOL phase of the task, in which they were presented, in a
fixed random order, with cue words alone (i.e., if partici-
pants learnt the cue-target pair ‘‘bear-bridge’’ then the JOL
for this word pair was cued by the presentation of ‘‘bear-
?’’). The only previous study of JOL accuracy (Wojcik
et al. 2014), alongside Experiment 1, asked participants to
make dichotomous (Yes/No) JOL assessments. In both
studies individuals with ASD did not demonstrate impair-
ments in monitoring accuracy, relative to neurotypical
individuals. However, it is possible that categorical
judgements might not provide the variation necessary to
observe group difference in JOL accuracy. As such, in this
experiment participants were presented with each cue word
individually for 5 s, and were asked to make a JOL on a
Table 3 Participant
characteristics (means, standard
deviations and inferential
statistics) for the participants in
Experiment 2
Group t p Cohen’s d
ASD (n = 22) Neurotypical (n = 21)
Age (years) 13.70 (1.45) 13.21 (1.18) 1.21 .234 0.37
VIQ 100.68 (15.48) 98.76 (12.54) 0.45 .658 0.14
PIQ 101.41 (14.80) 102.86 (14.11) 0.33 .744 0.10
FSIQ 100.95 (14.06) 101.14 (13.68) 0.04 .965 0.01
SRS total score 83.14 (9.93) 47.29 (11.66) 10.87 \.001 3.31
SRS Social Responsiveness Scale (Constantino et al. 2003); VIQ verbal IQ, PIQ performance IQ, FSIQ full
scale IQ
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scale of 1–5. It was explained to participants that a JOL of
1 indicated that they thought they would definitely not be
able to remember the missing target word, and a JOL of 5
indicated they thought they would definitely be able to
remember the missing target word. Immediately after the
JOL phase, participants completed a cued-recall test. Par-
ticipants were presented again with cue words alone, in a
different, fixed random order, and were asked to recall the
missing target word. Participants were not limited in the
amount of time they had to recall the target word for a
given cue word.
Cue-Target JOL Task
The cue-target JOL task followed the same procedure as the
cue-alone JOL task. However, during the JOL phase instead
of being presented with cue words alone, participants were
presented with the complete word pairs again (i.e., if par-
ticipants were presented with the cue-target pair ‘‘bear-
bridge’’ at study, then the JOL for this word pair was cued by
the presentation of ‘‘bear-bridge’’). Apart from this differ-
ence, the procedure for each JOL task was exactly the same.
Scoring
Participants’ basic memory performance was calculated as
the proportion of target words correctly recalled during the
cued-recall stage. Gamma correlations (Goodman and
Kruskal 1954) were calculated to provide an index of
overall JOL accuracy (please see above for a detailed
description of gamma correlations). Gamma correlations
were calculated based on all JOLs made.
Experiment 2: Results
Judgment of Learning (JOL) Tasks
Memory Performance
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations for cued-
recall performance on the cue-alone and cue-target JOL
tasks. A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out on these
data with Group (neurotypical/ASD) entered as the
between-subjects variable, and JOL Test Type (cue-target/
cue-alone) entered as the within-subject variable. There
was a significant main effect of JOL Test Type on recall
ability, reflecting the fact that, across participant groups,
adolescents recalled significantly more target words in the
cue-target JOL task (M = .49, SD = .21) than in the cue-
alone JOL task, (M = .34, SD = .16), F (1, 41) = 31.14,
p\ .001, gp
2 = .43. There was no significant main effect of
Group, F (1, 41) = 0.01, p = .917, gp
2\ .001, or
Group 9 JOL Test Type interaction, F (1, 41) = 1.08,
p = .305 gp
2 = .03. Thus, adolescents with ASD demon-
strated similar levels and patterns of recall to the neu-
rotypical adolescents.
Metacognitive performance
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations for
Gamma correlations on the cue-alone and cue-target JOL
tasks among ASD and neurotypical participants. A mixed-
model ANOVA was carried out on these data with Group
(neurotypical/ASD) entered as the between-subjects vari-
able, and JOL Test Type (cue-target/cue-alone) entered as
Fig. 2 Graphical
representations of the cue-alone
and cue-target judgment of
learning tasks used in
Experiment 2
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the within-subject variable. There was a significant main
effect of JOL Test Type on gamma scores, reflecting the
fact that (as expected) adolescents in both groups had
significantly lower gamma scores (i.e., lower accuracy) on
the cue-target JOL task than on the cue-alone JOL task,
F (1, 41) = 42.62, p\ .001, gp
2 = .51. The main effect of
Group was non-significant, indicating that adolescents with
ASD did not have lower gamma scores overall than neu-
rotypical adolescents overall, F (1, 41) = 0.46, p = .504,
gp
2 = .01. Finally, contrary to predictions, there was also no
significant Group x JOL Test Type interaction, F (1,
41) = 0.14, p = .706, gp
2\ .01. Thus, there were no sig-
nificant differences between ASD and neurotypical par-
ticipants in terms of either levels or patterns of
metacognitive performance on the two JOL tasks.1
Relation Between JOL Accuracy and SRS Scores
In order to investigate the relation between metacognitive
JOL accuracy and ASD/ASD-like traits, a series of corre-
lation analyses was performed. Among participants with
ASD, SRS score was not significantly associated with JOL
accuracy on either cue-target or cue-alone JOL tasks, all
rs B .19, all ps C .387. Likewise, among neurotypical
participants, SRS score was not significantly associated
with JOL accuracy on the cue-target task, r = .14,
p = .534. However, SRS score was significantly negatively
associated with JOL accuracy on the cue-alone task,
r = -.51, p = .02.
Discussion: Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we sought to test the hypothesis that par-
ticipants with ASD in Experiment 1 showed high JOL accu-
racybyemploying atypical ‘‘non-metacognitive’’ strategies. It
was predicted that itmay bepossible to showhigh accuracy on
cue-alone JOL tasks by using atypical, non-metacognitive
strategies, which should not be possible on cue-target JOL
tasks. However, contrary to expectations, we found no evi-
dence that adolescents with ASD show diminished JOL
accuracy on either type of task. Rather, the diagnostic groups
showed very similar levels and patterns of performance on
both cue-alone and cue-target JOL tasks. Recall of target
words was significantly better on the cue-target task than on
the cue-alone task in both groups, which was entirely expec-
ted, given that adolescents were presented with the target
words twice on the cue-target task, but only once during the
cue-alone task. As such, the ASD group demonstrated typical
cued-recall performance, compared to the neurotypical group.
This is in keeping with findings within the literature that
suggest, when cued-recall procedures are employed, indi-
viduals with ASD often exhibit relatively spared recall per-
formance (for a discussion, see Bowler et al. 1997; Bowler
et al. 2011). Across both groups, JOL accuracy was also sig-
nificantly higher in the cue-alone task than in the cue-target
task. This is in keeping with findings from the typically
developing literature, that suggest individuals tend to
demonstrate better metacognitive accuracy on cue-alone JOL
tasks than cue-target JOL task (e.g., Dunlosky and Nelson
1992, 1997). However, the finding that there was no hint of
between-group differences in JOL accuracy was unexpected.
General Discussion
Until now, only one study has explored JOL accuracy in
individuals with ASD (Wojcik et al. 2014). Based on their
results, the authors of that study concluded that JOL
Table 4 Means (SDs) and
inferential statistics for group
differences in performance on
both judgment of learning tasks
used in Experiment 2
Group t p Cohen’s d
ASD (n = 22) Neurotypical (n = 21)
Cue-alone recall performance .32 (.11) .36 (.21) 0.65 .517 0.24
Cue-target recall performance .50 (.21) .47 (.21) 0.33 .739 0.14
Cue-alone gamma scorea .89 (.12) .92 (.12) 0.67 .505 0.25
Cue-target gamma scorea .45 (.41) .53 (.45) 0.56 .582 0.19
a Gamma scores index metacognitive monitoring accuracy
1 As noted on in the ‘‘Participants’’ section of Experiment 2, four
neurotypical participants scored above cut-off on the SRS and one
participant with ASD scored below cut-off. If these participants are
excluded, participant groups remain closely matched, with small
effect sizes for between-group contrasts for all baseline characteristics
(chronological age, VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ; all ps C .19, all ds B 0.44).
In terms of experimental JOL task performance, the ASD and
neurotypical group also remained matched for cued-recall perfor-
mance, on both the cue-target and cue-alone JOL tasks (all ps C .37,
all ds B 0.29). Finally, when the mixed ANOVA reported in the
‘‘Metacognitive Performance’’ subsection of the ‘‘Experiment 2:
Results’’ section was re-run with these participants excluded, the
results were almost identical. There a significant main effect of JOL
Test Type on gamma scores, F (1, 36) = 42.96, p\ .001, gp
2 = .54
(note: in the original analysis gp
2 = .51). However, there was no
significant main effect of Group, F (1, 36) = 0.20, p = .656,
gp
2 = .006 (note: in the original analysis gp
2 = .01). Finally, there
was no significant Group x JOL Test Type interaction, F (1,
36) = 0.17, p = .679, gp
2 = .005 (note: in the original analysis
gp
2\ .01).
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accuracy is undiminished in ASD. However, there are
several methodological concerns with Wojcik et al.’s study
(outlined in the introduction) that we argue should lead to
caution when interpreting results. Moreover, there was, in
fact, some evidence of impaired immediate JOL accuracy
among Wojcik et al.’s sample of participants with ASD,
contrary to the authors’ interpretation. Given the uncer-
tainty regarding the ability of individuals with ASD to
monitor their own states of learning, we sought to inves-
tigate JOL accuracy among individuals with ASD (adults
and adolescents) and closely matched comparison partici-
pants. Based on clear evidence that individuals with ASD
have difficulties making metacognitive judgements other
than JOL, we predicted that JOL accuracy would be
diminished in ASD. However, we found no evidence of any
kind that this was the case. Across both a cue-alone JOL
tasks, and a cue-target JOL task adolescents and adults with
ASD demonstrated entirely typical JOL accuracy.
In Experiment 2, among neurotypical participants, JOL
accuracy on the cue-alone task was significantly associated
with ASD/ASD-like traits (as measured by the SRS). In the
neurotypical participants, higher levels of ASD-like traits
were predictive of poorer JOL accuracy on the cue-alone
task. This result is not in keeping with the equivalent
correlation analysis carried out among adults in Experi-
ment 1, which indicated that ASD-like traits (as measured
by the AQ) were not related significantly to recall or JOL
accuracy on a cue-alone task (in either group). It may be
that there is a developmental difference in the extent to
which JOL accuracy relates to ASD-like traits (i.e., that the
association diminishes over time). Alternatively, the dif-
ference between studies might be explained by the fact that
the AQ (a self-report measure) was used in Experiment 1,
whereas the SRS (a parent report measure) was used in
Experiment 2. Another alternative is that the significant
correlation in Experiment 2 is merely a chance result.
Certainly, we did not predict such an association and, as
such, the result would not survive Bonferroni correction for
multiple comparisons (with an adjusted alpha level of
.0125). It is clear that further research is needed to disen-
tangle these possibilities.
Before considering the explanations for and conse-
quences of our findings, it is important to consider the issue
of statistical power. Experiments 1 and 2 involved samples
of n = 18 and n = 21/22 respectively. This is comparable
with many published studies of ASD and, crucially, at least
as large as (or larger than) many studies of metacognitive
monitoring in ASD that report significant impairments in
ASD. However, it is possible to question whether the null
findings in the current study (or any study) are merely the
result of insufficient power. While it is, of course, possible
that between-group differences in JOL accuracy might
become statistically significant in a larger sample of
individuals with ASD, this would still not indicate a major
difficulty with making judgements of learning in this dis-
order; In Experiment 1, participants with ASD demon-
strated (non-significantly) better metacognitive accuracy
than comparison participants (associated with a small effect
size of d = 0.37) and, across both tasks in Experiment 2,
participants with ASD showed only very slightly (and non-
significantly) lower JOL accuracy (again associated with a
small average effect size of d = 0.22). This consistency in
our findings of only small, non-significant between-group
differences in JOL accuracy (in two different samples
across three different tasks) reduces the likelihood that the
findings represent a Type II error. Nonetheless, we took two
further steps to address this issue.
First, we have conducted a power analysis using
G*Power3 (Faul et al. 2007) to establish the power of our
study to detect the predicted between-group differences in
JOL accuracy if they really existed (based on an assumed
sample size of 18 participants per group in Experiment 1,
and 21/22 participants per group in Experiment 2, and one-
tailed tests). To do this, we needed to estimate an effect size
for the predicted between-group differences.2 This estima-
tion was not straightforward; As we have argued, some
studies of metacognitive monitoring in ASD have potential
confounds in the methods and/or data analyses employed.
These confounds render the effect sizes reported for
between-group differences in monitoring ability potentially
unreliable. Nonetheless, if we pool the effect sizes from all
eight studies of judgements of confidence and feelings of
knowing judgements, we arrive at a Cohen’s d value of 0.68
for between-group differences in metacognitive ability (full
details available from the authors upon request). Assuming
this is reliable (although we think it is likely to be an
underestimate), then our contrasts in Experiments 1 and 2
had between 64 and 71 % power to detect predicted
between-group differences, which is somewhat below the
80 % power recommended by Cohen (1992).
Second, we calculated a Bayes factor for each of the
between-group contrasts in JOL accuracy gamma, using an
online Bayes calculator (Dienes 2008). Bayes factors pro-
vide a means of assessing the relative evidence for or
against a given theory (e.g., Rouder et al. 2012). Bayes
factors are particularly useful for interpreting null results,
because they provide a means of establishing how rela-
tively strong the evidence is in favour of one hypothesis (in
this case, the null) over another hypothesis (see Dienes
2014). Jeffreys’ (1961) widely-used criteria for interpreting
Bayes factors suggest that factors of[3 provide evidence
for the alternative hypothesis, whereas values\1 provide
2 Note that a post hoc power calculation based on observed effect
sizes in one’s data does not provide a means of judging the likelihood
of whether a Type II error has been made (Baguley 2004).
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evidence for the null hypothesis. Bayes factors between 1
and 3 provide inconsistent evidence for either hypothesis.
The contrasts in Experiments 1 and 2 were associated with
Bayes factors of between 0.04 and 0.34, which represents
between ‘‘strong’’ and ‘‘moderate-to-anecdotal’’ evidence
for the null hypothesis.
Previous findings suggest that individuals with ASD
demonstrate diminished metacognitive accuracy on both
feeling of knowing (e.g., Grainger et al. 2014; Wojcik et al.
2013) and judgment of confidence tasks (e.g., Grainger et al.
2016; Wilkinson et al. 2010). How can the current finding of
undiminished JOL accuracy in the current study be recon-
ciled with these findings? Currently there is ongoing debate
within the literature as to whether individuals possess
general metacognitive abilities, which remain stable across
metacognitive tasks, or whether metacognitive ability is
task specific (see e.g., Song et al. 2011; Kelemen et al.
2000). Interestingly several studies have found that an
individual’s accuracy on one metacognitive task does not
necessarily correlate with their accuracy on a different task
(Souchay and Isingrini 2012; Souchay et al. 2004). Findings
such as this have led some researchers to argue against the
concept of a general metacognitive ability. If individuals do
not hold a general metacognitive ability, it is possible that
individuals with ASD are only impaired in some aspects of
metacognition (feeling of knowing judgments/judgments of
confidence) and not others (JOL).
Another explanation for the pattern of performance seen
across studies among people with ASD comes from neu-
roimaging evidence. Chua et al. (2009) found that both
feeling of knowing and judgment of confidence tasks appear
to elicit activation in the right temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ). However, the only two fMRI studies of JOL accuracy
to date found no indication that TPJ was activated during
JOL tasks (Do Lam et al. 2012; Kao et al. 2005). Given
(a) substantial evidence that the right TPJ plays a pivotal
role in representing others’ mental states (mindreading; see
Perner et al. 2006; Samson et al. 2004; Saxe and Powell
2006); (b) that individuals with ASD show deficits on tasks
that rely on TPJ (e.g., Castelli et al. 2002), and (c) that some
theories predict impaired metacognition in ASD only to the
extent that mindreading is impaired (e.g., Carruthers 2009),
it is perhaps not inexplicable that judgment of confidence
and feeling of knowing accuracy are selectively diminished
(leaving JOL accuracy undiminished) among people with
this disorder. Currently, there is not enough evidence to
determine the best explanation for the pattern of results that
appears in ASD (largely impaired feeling of knowing and
judgment of confidence accuracy in ASD, alongside intact
JOL accuracy). As such, it will be important that future
research investigates this further, particularly studies that
assess metacognitive accuracy across several tasks in the
same individuals.
Whatever the explanation for the finding of undimin-
ished JOL accuracy in the current study, the finding itself
has important implications for educational practice.
Judgements of learning are considered to have different
functions for everyday learning and control of behaviour/
cognition than feelings of knowing and judgements of
confidence. For example, judgments of learning specifi-
cally are thought to be involved in guiding allocation of
study time and self-paced study, which are determinants of
learning success (e.g., Son and Metcalfe 2000). For
example, individuals can use judgements of learning to
(a) decide whether or not to study particular information
(with sufficiently high judgments of learning leading to no
study), and (b) decide on the order of priority that infor-
mation should be studied in (see e.g., Metcalfe and Kornell
2005; Kornell and Metcalfe 2006). During efficient learn-
ing, people adaptively study material they believe they
almost know first, then progressively more difficult mate-
rial (i.e., studying items with high judgements of learning
first, then material with low judgements of learning).
Alternatively, learners might first choose to study items
they judge as difficult (i.e., items given low judgements of
learning; Dunlosky and Hertzog 1997; Thiede and Dun-
losky 1999). Either way, efficient learning and decision-
making rely to some extent on an individual being able to
make relatively accurate judgments of learning. Indeed,
JOL accuracy is a specific predictor of learning ability
(e.g., Thiede 1999). Given that adults and adolescents with
ASD appear as accurate as neurotypical individuals at JOL,
it would be useful for teachers to encourage students with
ASD to make explicit judgments of learning when trying to
learn new material. It may be that adolescents with ASD do
not make such judgements spontaneously, as neurotypical
adolescents do, and so future research might usefully
explore the effect on learning of asking versus not asking
adolescents to make such judgements.
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